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HISTORIC PRESERVATION-TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AS
MITIGATION RATHER THAN JUST COM[PENSATIN-Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Plaintiff was prevented by the New York City Landmarks Preser-
vation Law' from erecting a multi-story office building above Grand
Central Railroad Terminal.2 Plaintiff was not compensated, but was
allowed to transfer the Terminal's unused development rights to other
sites.3 The trial court found this restriction unconstitutional unless
"just compensation" was provided, and granted injunctive and declar-
atory relief.4 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, re-
versed, finding that Penn Central, the plaintiff, had not been uncon-
stitutionally deprived of its property.5 This decision was affirmed by
1. NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to
207-21.0 (1976), reprinted in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 76a, Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Landmarks Preservation Law
was adopted in 1965 under authority of the state enabling act, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §
96-a (McKinney 1977). The Landmarks Law established a Landmarks Preservation
Commission. The Commission, on August 2, 1967, designated the Terminal a landmark
for having, as the law provides, "a special character or special historical or aesthetic in-
terest or value as part of the development, heritage, or cultural characteristics of the
city, state, or nation." NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A, §
207-1.0(n) (1976). The New York Board of Estimate finalized the landmark designa-
tion on September 21, 1967. Penn Central did not seek judicial review of the designa-
tion. Designation of the Terminal as a landmark imposed a duty on Penn Central to
keep the exterior of the building in good repair. Id. § 207-10.0(a). Designation also im-
posed a requirement on Penn Central to obtain permission from the Commission before
making any exterior alterations or additions to the site. Id. §§ 207-4.0 to 207-9.0.
Penn Central submitted two plans to the Commission for the proposed addition. Certifi-
cates of no exterior effect, id. § 207-5.0, and certificates of appropriateness, id. § 207-
6.0, were denied for both plans. Since the Terminal had a tax exemption and was suit-
able for its present uses, Penn Central was precluded from applying for a certificate of
appropriateness on the ground of "insufficient return." Id. § 207-8.0. See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1978).
2. Two plans were submitted. One called for a 55-story office building cantilevered
above the Terminal's facade and resting on the Terminal's roof. The second plan con-
templated tearing down a portion of the Terminal, including the 42d Street facade, and
constructing a 53-story office building, to rest on the Terminal's roof. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1978).
3. Id. at 113-14. See note 18 infra.
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, Index No. 14763 (Sup. Ct., New
York County, N.Y., judgment filed Feb. 4, 1975) (findings of fact and declarations of
law, order of severance, memorandum decision, and judgment), reported in N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 23, 1975, at 16, col. 3, reprinted in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 51a,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d
20 (1975).
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the New York Court of Appeals. 6 In a six to three decision, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Plaintiff's property was
not taken unconstitutionally because the combined effect of the re-
strictions and the allowed transfer of unused development rights per-
mitted the owner a reasonable beneficial use of its property. Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
State police power includes land use regulation for the public
good. 7 Zoning and nuisance laws are common examples. This power
is subject to two distinct constitutional limitations. The first is the due
process requirement of the fourteenth amendment-"nor shall any
State deprive any person of . . .property, without due process of
law." 8 Due process requires land use regulation to be reasonable and
not arbitrary.9 The reasonableness of regulation is often tested
through the "means-end" test. The purpose of the enactment must be
a valid public purpose, 0 and the means employed must bear a ratio-
nal relationship to the purpose."1
The states' police power is further limited by the fifth amendment
command-"nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." 12 Thus, when the state exercises its power of
eminent domain and displaces a property owner, just compensation is
required.13 In certain cases just compensation is even required when
6. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
7. "[W] here the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the
property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property."
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928). See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
10. Allowed public purposes justifying an exercise of police power include commu-
nity health, morals, and safety. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593
(1962) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)). The police power may
also be exercised for aesthetic purposes. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297 (1976) (historic district regulation upheld as valid exercise of police power).
11. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (quot-
ing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the fifth amendment does not apply directly to
state action, its edict that private property is not to be taken for public use without just
compensation has been held to apply to the states as part of due process of law required
by the fourteenth amendment. United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266,
279 (1943); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
13. Each state has power to acquire property within its jurisdiction for public use or
a public purpose by eminent domain. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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only some of an owner's property rights are extinguished.1 4 The test is
often one of degree.' 5 "If regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."' 6
Land use regulation constitutes either a police power regulation or
a taking. The effect of this dichotomy is to put the entire financial
burden of land use regulation either solely on the owner or solely on
the state. A regulation upheld as a valid exercise of the police power
imposes its resulting financial burden, if any, on the owner, but a reg-
14. In determining whether land use regulation effects a taking, the courts identify
and examine several factors. These include the nature of the regulatory objective, see,
e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); the distribution of the burden, see,
e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); and the diminution in value of
the property, see, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). As a re-
sult, the courts look to "the particular circumstances of each case" to determine if a reg-
ulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking. United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). The Court in Penn Central characterized the question as
being comprised of"ad hoc, factual inquiries." 438 U.S. at 124 (1978).
Theories of the taking issue have been presented in the literature, but with little
agreement. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 124-38
(1973) [hereinafter cited as BOSSELMAN]; Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Ac-
commodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
COL. L. REv. 1021 (1975); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation," 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 (1971); Stoebuck, A
General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 533 (1972); Van Alstyne, Tak-
ing or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971); Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to
Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH.
L. REV. 315 (1979).
15. Besides the extent of the owner's loss, other factors considered in the determina-
tion of a taking include the nature of the regulatory objective and the suitability of the
regulation to the nature of the property. BOSSELMAN, supra note 14, at 195-207. See
Van Alstyne, supra note 14; Comment, supra note 14, at 321-24.
16. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). The early Supreme
Court cases consistently affirmed that regulation could not result in a taking, barring
governmental use, occupation, taking of title, or displacement of the owner. "A prohibi-
tion simply upon the use of property for purposes that are determined, by valid legisla-
tion, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just
sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit." Mu-
gler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). For example, in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v.
Drainage Comm'rs, 201 U.S. 561 (1906), a statutory requirement that a railroad com-
pany remove and replace its railway bridge, due to widening of a stream, did not consti-
tute a taking.
The thrust of constitutional taking law was redirected, however, by Justice Holmes'
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See BOSSELMAN,
supra note 14, at 124-38. But see Corker, Limits to "The Petty Larceny of the Police
Power," in TWENTIETH ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 67, 71, 78-
79 (1975) (Proceedings) (arguing that BOSSELMAN seriously exaggerates the extent to
which Mahon rewrote constitutional law). The decision in Mahon reversed a Pennsylva-
nia decision granting an injunction, pursuant to statute, to a homeowner against a coal
mining company whose mining operations were causing subsidence under his house.
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ulation found to be so burdensome as to constitute a taking imposes
on the state the requirement of providing the owner with just compen-
sation. 17
New York City, by allowing the restricted owner to transfer his
unused development rights, attempted to steer a middle course be-
Justice Holmes saw the determination of regulatory takings as a question of degree. In
discussing limitations on the police power of the government to diminish property
values without payment, Justice Holmes stated:
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminu-
tion. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act ...
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
260 U.S. at 413-15.
Since Mahon the Supreme Court has heard few land use cases, but in one recent case
Mahon was cited as providing the appropriate test. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962). The "regulation as a taking" approach of Mahon has been followed
by the state courts. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761,
767 (1972). In New York, however, the court has held that regulation per se could not
amount to a taking. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366
N.E.2d 1271. 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). aff'd on other grounds, 438 U.S. 104 (1978):
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). See note 38 infra. The United States Supreme Court in Penn Central
rejected the proposition that government cannot effect a taking through regulation. 438
U.S. at 123 n.25.
17. The validity of an award of just compensation, in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, is conditioned upon satisfaction of stringent requirements. Property
may only be appropriated for a public purpose. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Although the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require a jury
trial on the issue of damages in condemnation cases, Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142
(1922), many states have adopted such jury trial requirements or other elaborate
procedural safeguards. I L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN §
8, at 52-56 (2d ed. 1953).
Just compensation is required to be in monetary form. For example, state courts have
held payment by warrants invalid, Martin v. Tyler, 4 N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894).
and have held payment by other lands to be invalid, Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip.
Co., 281 N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272 (1972). The United States Supreme Court. however,
has allowed benefits accruing to the landowner's remaining property, due to the public
improvement necessitating the taking, to be set off. "The Constitution of the United
States contains no express prohibition against considering benefits in estimating the just
compensation to be paid for private property taken for public use: and. . . no such pro-
hibition can be implied." Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897) (in a partial taking,
special benefits could be set off if capable of present estimate and reasonable computa-
tion). Cf. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R., 247 U.S. 354 (1918) (general benefits could
be set off in considering whether compensation was due to hotel owner whose property
was damaged by construction of nearby elevated railway). The Court has not otherwise
addressed the issue of nonmonetary compensation as just compensation.
The amount ofjust compensation required is measured by the "highest and best use."
and is essentially fair market value. Board of Educ. v. 13 Acres of Land, 50 Del. 387,
131 A.2d 180 (1957). The fair market value is determined under existing or reasonably
probable zoning. Union Elec. Co. v. Saale, 377 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1964).
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tween putting the loss either completely on the owner or completely
on the city. 18 This note addresses the Court's consideration of trans-
ferable development rights (TDRs) in its determination of whether the
restrictions constituted a taking. By considering TDRs in the taking
question, and not as compensation, the Court has narrowed the taking
test so that just compensation will be required in fewer cases. The re-
sult is equitable because it encourages the granting of nonmonetary
benefits to restricted owners. 19 The regulation survives, yet the
owner's loss is mitigated.
I. THE ROLE OF TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION
The development of TDRs by land use and planning theorists has
been in response to the need for more effective tools to meet the loss
18. The origins of the New York TDR plan lie in incentive zoning. Incentive zon-
ing plans allow a developer a limited departure from zoning restrictions in return for
providing amenities which would not otherwise be provided. For example, in New York
City a developer may exceed the allowable maximum floor area of his building by up to
20% in exchange for a ground level plaza. See Note. Development Rights Transfer in
New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 347-48 (1972). The basics of a TDR program were
implemented when the New York zoning ordinance was amended, modifying the defini-
tion of a zoning lot to allow the owner of a designated landmark to transfer density
from one lot to another, "contiguous" but not necessarily adjacent, or adjacent but not
under common ownership'. New York City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793, re-
printed in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at I 13a-1 18a, Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York
City, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 372, 375 (1971); Note, supra at 349-58. These modifica-
tions of the zoning plan were a response to growing recognition that zoning based on in-
dividual lots maximizes development pressure on high value, underdeveloped
properties, and that zoning based on a larger unit of control than the individual lot can
be more effective. See Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Tak-
ing Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 88
(1974). For a discussion of incentive zoning, see J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 28-39, 86-
87 (1974). Related land use techniques include cluster zoning and planned unit develop-
ment (PUD) zoning. Id. at 128-29. See also J. BARNETT, URBAN DESIGN As PUBLIC POL-
ICY 37-43 (1974).
Transfer of density under New York's incentive zoning plan has been upheld. New-
port Assocs. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973) (lessee under a long term lease could, under New York
City zoning code, transfer unused floor area to adjacent site owned by him in fee);
Fur-Lex Realty, Inc. v. Lindsay, 81 Misc. 2d 904, 367 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(lessee of public building, with sublease back to the city, could transfer unused floor
area of leased building to adjacent lot owned in fee).
19. "Government has scarce dollar resources to offset the private impact of public
regulation. As allocator and, frequently, outright creator of lucrative development op-
portunities, on the other hand, government has at its disposal a substantial pool of non-
dollar but marketworthy compensatory alternatives that could be devoted to this pur-
pose." Costonis, supra note 14, at 1039.
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of valued urban and rural environmental features. In recent years
many irreplaceable landmark buildings of great aesthetic, cultural,
and architectural significance have been demolished to make way for
more intensive urban development. 20 Millions of acres of prime farm-
land have been lost irreversibly to residential and commercial devel-
opment.21 Recently, TDRs have been proposed and implemented to
combat these losses. 22 TDRs have been used for landmark preserva-
tion in New York City,2 3 have been proposed in a different form for
20. Over half of the approximately twelve thousand buildings listed in the federal
government's Historic American Buildings Survey, begun in 1933, have been demol-
ished. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 574 (1972) (citing Conti, Preserving the Past, Wall
St. J., Aug. 8, 1970, at 1, col. 1). Such architectural landmarks as New York's Pennsyl-
vania Station, and Chicago's Garrick Theater and Old Stock Exchange building, despite
publicity, pleas, and special committees, have fallen victims to new construction. See J.
COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974).
21. Every year since World War II an area larger than Delaware has been lost to
farming due to development, averaging 1.4 million acres a year. Suddenly, An Alarm
over Vanishing Farms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 15, 1975, at 67. See gener-
ally THE USE OF LAND (W. Reilly ed. 1973); Saving the Farms, TIME, Apr. 21, 1975, at
48.
22. One early mention of TDRs is contained in Lloyd, Transferable Density in
Connection with Density Zoning in NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOP-
MENT, Appendix G at 136 (Urban Land Inst. Tech. Bull. No. 40, 1961).
23. Examination of the uses of TDRs, actual and proposed, properly begins with
New York City. New York was the first authority to implement a TDR program, and
the only case law on the subject has arisen from the New York program. See text accom-
panying notes 31-38 infra. The New York TDR program applicable to landmark own-
ers is implemented in New York City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793, reprinted
in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at I 13a-1 18a, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The owner may sell or transfer his development rights,
measured by the difference between the allowable floor area under the applicable zon-
ing and the actual floor area of the transferor site, to an adjacent site, including those
adjacent but for streets or street intersections. The floor area on the transferee site is not
allowed to exceed the zoning limits by more than 20%. In the central business district,
which includes Grand Central Station, the 20% limitation does not apply and transferee
sites include lots which, except for intervention of streets or street intersections, form a
series extending to the transferor lot, if all including the transferee lot are under
common ownership. The unused floor area of the transferor site, once transferred, is
gone forever. If a new building is later constructed on the site, its floor area will be sub-
ject to the reduced limit. See generally Baker, Development Rights Transfer and Land-
marks Preservation-Providing a Sense of Orientation, 9 URB. L. ANN. 131 (1975);
Elliot & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Con-
trols, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973), excerpts reprinted in TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS 157 (J. Rose ed. 1975).
The criticisms of the New York plan are several. The adjacency limitations on trans-
feree sites limit its application, reduce the marketability of the development rights, and
may result in the landmark being dwarfed by the bulk of surrounding buildings. The ad-
ministrative procedures involved in the transfer are forbidding. And there is no
guarantee that the landmark building will be preserved, as a new building may later be
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landmark preservation in Costonis' Chicago Plan,24 have been pro-
posed as a total substitute for Euclidean zoning,25 and have been pro-
posed and implemented in a variety of contexts for preservation of
open space, farmland, and environmentally sensitive areas. 26
The TDR concept isolates one of the owner's property rights-the
constructed on the site, subject to the reduced floor area. See Costonis, supra note 20.
See generally J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 54-60 (1974). The New York plan has been
characterized as unnecessary, unreliable, unserviceable, and pernicious. Note, Devel-
opment Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE LJ. 338, 370-71 (1972). It has
been argued that the plan is unconstitutional because TDRs have an uncertain market
value and would not suffice as compensation for development restrictions. Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975).
24. The Chicago Plan has been proposed by Professor Costonis as a comprehensive
method of preserving urban historic landmark buildings, although never implemented.
See J. CosToNIs, SPACE ADRIFT (1974); Costonis, supra note 20; Newsom, Critique of
the Chicago Plan, in TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 9 (Planning Advisory Serv-
ice Report No. 304, 1975). The Chicago Plan provides for transfer of development
rights, measured by the difference between buildable floor area of the site under the
zoning code and the actual floor area of the landmark. The development rights may be
transferred to one or more sites anywhere within a designated transfer district, as long
as the allowable floor area of any transferee site will not be increased by more than
15%. The transferor receives a reduction in his real estate taxes. He must convey to the
city, in exchange for the transfer authorization, a preservation restriction binding him
and his successors to maintain the landmark. Unlike the New York plan, the city has the
power to condemn a preservation restriction. Where condemnation is utilized, compen-
sation is provided by proceeds of sale of development rights from a development rights
bank. The bank would be credited with those rights condemned, with rights donated by
owners of other landmarks, and rights from publicly owned landmarks.
The Chicago Plan, by removing adjacency restrictions on transferee sites, alleviates
the problem of the landmark being dwarfed by a cluster of oversized surrounding build-
ings and broadens the marketability of development rights. A detailed economic analy-
sis of the proposal is presented in J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 65-125 (1974). See also
The Costs of Preservation: The Chicago Plan, 42 APPRAISAL J. 402 (1974).
The plan has been criticized as financially unworkable, bad for urban design, and
constitutionally defective. See Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Con-
troversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 805-12 (1976);
Newsom, supra. The Chicago Plan has not been enacted in Chicago or elsewhere. See
generally Costonis, The Chicago Plan: A Case Study of the Gulf Between Law and So-
cial Change, in LAW AND THE CITY 18 (May 1975) (Open Grants Paper, No. 3, East-
West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii).
25. For a description of a plan to use TDRs as a replacement for zoning as a pri-
mary method of land use control, see Moore, TDR's as the Solution to Failings of Exist-
ing Land-Use Controls: Fairfax County, Virginia, in TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS 27 (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 304, 1975). See also W. GOODMAN,
DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ON TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, ACCOMPANYING
PROPOSED LEGISLATION (1970), excerpts reprinted in TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS 210 (J. Rose ed. 1975); Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights: An Idea
In Search of Implementation, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 339, 350-51 (1976).
26. For a recent survey of state and local TDR programs designed and imple-
mented to preserve environmentally sensitive areas, open space, and farmlands, see
Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. REV. 77, 101-15 (1978).
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right to develop a particular property for a more intensive use. If the
government restricts the owner's right to develop one property, that
development potential can be transferred and added to the develop-
ment potential of other property. 27 As used in historic preservation
and open space regulation, TDRs serve two purposes. First, by allow-
ing the owner of restricted property a valuable, compensatory right,
TDRs reduce the financial hardship of the regulatory scheme on the
owner.28 Second, particularly in the preservation of farmlands and
open space, TDRs can provide both (1) an outlet for economic devel-
opment pressures by redirecting development to other sites and
areas, 29 and (2) a control on development by facilitating appropriate
choices of transferee locations and districts .30
The only cases involving TDRs have arisen in New York. 31 The
27. The concept of TDRs makes sense only when land is subject to governmentally
imposed limits on development. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 35 (1974). In highly devel-
oped central urban areas, development is usually controlled by bulk or density zoning.
TDRs, by transferring the allowable but unbuilt floor area of one site to another, allow
the zoning limit on the transferee site to be exceeded. In effect the zoning limit is perma-
nently decreased on the transferor site and permanently increased on the transferee site.
The zoning density of the total area is not changed, but is reallocated. Shlaes, Who Pays
For Transfer of Development Rights, 40 PLANNING 7-9 (1974), excerpts reprinted in
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 330 (J. Rose ed. 1975).
28. Whether in a given situation TDRs have any substantial value depends on sev-
eral factors. See text accompanying notes 34-36 infra.
29. From the owner's perspective, the economic pressure to redevelop may appear
compelling.
Public and private sectors work through complex regulatory procedures which do
not adequately deal with the primary force shaping land use and development-
private economic self-interest. More powerful than a thousand tornados, this force
uproots old buildings, covers vast acreage of rich farm land with suburban sprawl,
darkens the air, and pollutes the water ...
What is needed are techniques that appeal to the economic self-interest of all the
parties involved; techniques that work with the market system not against it.
Gans, Saving Valued Spaces and Places Through Development Rights Transfers, in
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 275, 275-76 (J. Rose ed. 1975) (footnotes omit-
ted).
30. Because TDRs are only meaningful when land uses are restricted in some form,
see note 27 supra, TDRs are inherently bound up with land use planning. TDR plans
generally call for further involvement by planning authorities in the form of required
approval for specific transferee locations on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., New York
City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793, reprinted in Appendix to Jurisdictional
Statement at 113a-l18a, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). The Chicago Plan would also implement planning controls through municipal
review and approval of all transfers. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 54-55, 126-44 (1974).
3 1. See note 18 supra for cases upholding the validity of development rights trans-
fers to adjacent lots, under the New York City Zoning Resolution definition of "zoning
lot." New York's Landmark Preservation Law was upheld in Lutheran Church v. City
of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 35 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1974). The availability
of TDRs is not discussed in the Lutheran Church opinion.
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New York courts, while not categorizing TDRs as a traditional prop-
erty interest,32 have found development rights to have a value of their
own and to be transferable to other sites.33 However, the precise value
of TDRs is often elusive; their value depends on zoning limitations,34
physical and economic constraints on the transferee site,35 and any re-
quired administrative approval of the transfer.36
Because of its contingency-ridden nature, the TDR plan was held
ineffective to assure preservation of the economic value of develop-
ment rights in Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New York
(Tudor Parks),37 which invalidated as violative of due process the re-
zoning of two private parks as public parks. Tudor Parks did not
bode well for the future of TDRs as a regulatory tool in New York.
Nevertheless, one year later the Court of Appeals, relying in part on
the availability of TDRs, upheld the landmark restriction preventing
Penn Central from erecting an office tower above Grand Central Ter-
32. Transferable development rights are properly distinguished from air rights. Air
rights are a property interest in a defined volume in space. Costonis, supra note 20, at
592 n.58. TDRs are not associated with a distinct volume in space, and are only associ-
ated with a distinct transferee location after the transfer has been implemented. TDRs
have been characterized as "simply a governmental license." Id. Although no court has
had occasion to rule on the question, TDRs are better characterized as an interest in
property. The right to build more intensively on one piece of land, in exchange for limit-
ing development on another, may appear to be a novel property interest. Nevertheless,
it is consistent with the notion that the essence of land ownership, particularly in the ur-
ban setting, is not so much physical control as it is the right to extract a profit. See, e.g.,
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921). See RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), Justice Holmes wrote, quoting from Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 256
Pa. 328, 331, 100 A. 820, 820 (1917)," 'For practical purposes, the right to coal consists
in the right to mine it.'. . . What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be
exercised with profit." 260 U.S. at 414 (citation omitted). Similarly, urban land has
value to the extent of the right to build a profit making structure on it. TDRs do not
abolish that right but redirect it to a different location.
33. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 597, 350 N.E.2d
381, 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11 (1976). See Newport Assocs. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263,
283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
34. See note 27 supra.
35. See J. CosToNIs, SPACE ADRIFT 95-103 (1974); Berger, supra note 24, at 806.
For example, in Penn Central the available transferee sites had buildings on them with
long term leases, and some of the sites posed construction difficulties. In contrast, con-
struction above the Terminal could have begun after 90 days, with almost no disruption
to the activities of the Terminal. Appendix at 42 (separately bound joint appendix to the
briefs), Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
36. Development rights will have reduced value to the extent there is a substantial
likelihood that the transfer will be disapproved and to the extent that delay is involved in
the approval process. Appendix at 39-42 (separately bound joint appendix to the briefs),
Penn Cent. Transport. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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minal in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 38 It
was against this meager background of TDR case law that the United
States Supreme Court had to decide the relevance of TDRs to plain-
tiff's claim of an unconstitutional taking.
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
Justice Brennan's majority opinion failed to distinguish carefully
the due process issue from the taking issue. Speaking solely in terms
of the taking issue, the Court first found the Landmarks Law valid
under a reasonableness test,39 a test usually associated with due pro-
cess rather than the taking issue. It then examined the question
whether the interference with plaintiffs property was severe enough
that "there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain [it] ."40
Although the Court never articulated them as such, it addressed
several due process challenges to the reasonableness of the Land-
marks Law. The Court held that the effect of the Landmarks Law was
not discriminatory zoning because the law embodied a comprehensive
plan.41 Landmark designation was not arbitrary because judicial re-
38. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In a novel opinion upholding the restrictions, the court
held that without government occupation, use, or taking of title, land use regulation
could not constitute a taking requiring just compensation. The court therefore used a
due process analysis, and held that the regulatory scheme must allow the landowner a
reasonable rate of return, but only on the privately created component of the property's
value. Further, in computing this return, some of the income from Penn Central's other
holdings in the area must be imputed to the Terminal. The decision has been com-
mented upon in the following articles: Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the
Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402 (1977); Note, New York City
Landmarks Law-Due Process Limitations on Land Use Regulation, 42 ALB. L. REV.
523 (1978); Note, Preservation of Urban Landmarks: An Innovative Approach, 57
B.U.L. REV. 931 (1977); Comment, Grand Central Terminal and the New York Court
of Appeals: "Pure" Due Process, Reasonable Return, and Betterment Recovery, 78 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 134 (1978); Note, Penn Central v. City of New York: A Landmark Land-
mark Case, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 667 (1978); Comment, Cultural Ecology: The Urban
Landmark as an Environmental Resource, I I U.S.F.L. REV. 720 (1977).
39. 438 U.S. at 131-35.
40. 438 U.S. at 136 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922)).
41. 438 U.S. at 132. The Court found that the comprehensive plan to preserve struc-
tures of historic or aesthetic interest prevented the Landmarks Law from being discrimi-
natory or "reverse spot" zoning. Id. Although the operation of the law singled out indi-
vidual owners scattered across the city, there were adequate reasons for the selection
and restriction of an individual landmark. Presumably, it was similarly reasonable to
permit zoning limits to be exceeded on the sites to which development rights were trans-
ferable.
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view was available. 42 As with nuisance laws, singling out individual
properties was acceptable to prevent harm to the community.43 Hav-
ing sustained the law's validity, the Court then considered whether the
particular impact on the plaintiff constituted a taking.
The taking issues were framed as (1) whether the restrictions ef-
fected a taking requiring the payment of just compensation, and (2) if
they did effect a taking, whether the TDRs provided just compensa-
tion.44 Because the Court found no taking,45 it did not reach the
second issue. The Court considered several factors, 46 but the primary
factor was the financial hardship imposed on the plaintiff.47 Examina-
tion of the effect on the entire parcel48 showed that the plaintiff could
continue the property's existing use49 and obtain a reasonable return
on its investment.5 0 In considering the space above the building, the
42. The Landmarks Law provided that judicial review was available for decisions
of the Landmarks Preservation Commission, including the initial decision to designate
the structure a landmark, as well as any decision to deny an owner a certificate of ap-
propriateness or a certificate of no exterior effect. Id. at 132-33.
43. Id. at 133.
44. Id. at 122. The Court noted that Penn Central did not contest that preservation
of landmark structures is a permissible governmental goal or that the Landmarks Law's
restrictions were an appropriate means to achieve its purposes. Id. at 129.
45. Id. at 136-38. The Court explicitly rejected the proposition that the taking pro-
hibition of the fifth amendment applies only when a government transfers physical con-
trol or title to land. It thus followed the approach of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) (whether a prohibition of a use of property invokes the taking
prohibition is a matter of degree). The New York Court of Appeals had not taken this
approach. Penn Central, 42 N.Y.2d at 336-37, 336 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
921; Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
46. The inquiry was characterized by the Court as "ad hoc," and depending "largely
'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.'" 438 U.S. at 124. (1978) (quoting
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)).
47. 438 U.S. at 136-37.
48. Rather than attempt to determine if the rights in a particular segment of the par-
cel had been completely extinguished, the Court assessed the nature and extent of inter-
ference with rights in the whole parcel. 438 U.S. at 130-31 (citing Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting further subjacent development of
gravel pit upheld), Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (requirement that portions of
parcels be left unbuilt upheld), and Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (height restric-
tion on city buildings upheld)).
49. "Its designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appel-
lants may -continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years:
as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions." 438 U.S. at 136.
50. The Court concluded that "on this record, we must regard the New York City
law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but to obtain a
'reasonable return' on its investment." Id. Plaintiff maintained that it was not receiving
a reasonable return and, to support its claim of loss, had submitted a "Statement of Rev-
enues and Costs" for 1969 and 1971. But plaintiff improperly attributed railroad oper-
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Court pointed out that the Landmarks Law did not render the air
rights totally useless. 51 There was no showing that an office tower
smaller than the one rejected could not be built,5 2 and moreover the
unused portion of the air rights, to the zoning limits, could be trans-
ferred to other sites.53 Without addressing whether TDRs would have
been adequate as just compensation, the Court found that they were
valuable and mitigated the financial burden of the Landmarks Law
on the plaintiff, and had to be considered in assessing the impact of
the regulation. 54 The Court concluded that, under the circumstances
of this case, the net impact of the regulation on the plaintiff was not
severe enough to constitute a taking.55
III. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
Before holding that there was no violation of due process in the
Landmarks Law, the Court discussed past nuisance cases. The discus-
sion revealed a shift in focus from the noxious character of the non-
ating expenses to real estate operations and failed to impute any rental value to that
part of the Terminal devoted to railroad operations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 28 (1975). Further, there was no
showing that plaintiff could not operate the Terminal at a profit, even if it were cur-
rently operating at a loss. "If the courts were forced to look to the property as it is,
rather than as it could be, any inadequacy of managers of property could frustrate any
land use restrictions." Penn Central, 42 N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397
N.Y.S.2d at 919.
51. 438 U.S. at 137.
52. Id. The Terminal was originally planned and constructed to allow for later ad-
dition of a 20-story office building above it.
53. Id.
54. Id. The precise value of the rights is difficult to determine. See text accompany-
ing notes 34-36.
55. 438 U.S. at 137-38. The primary detriment to Penn Central was loss of rental
income from the planned building. Penn Central had entered into an agreement with
Union General Properties, Ltd. (UGP). UGP was to construct the office tower and
promised to pay Penn Central $1 million annually during construction and at least $3
million annually after the building was completed. This rental income would be par-
tially offset by a loss of up to $1 million in rent from displaced concessionaires. Id. at
116. Thus the burden of the restriction, after the construction period, was in excess of $2
million a year in lost income, offset by any income generated by the sale or use of the
TDRs.
The Court accepted the judgment of the New York City Council that preservation of
landmarks benefits all New York citizens and owners of structures economically (e.g.,
by attracting more tourists and visitors) and improves the quality of life in the city. Id.
at 109, 134-35. The benefits to Penn Central are clearly not susceptible to measure-
ment. Without the TDRs in the equation, the imbalance would be extreme. The TDRs
tend to level the scales, but the degree to which they do so is uncertain because their
value is so conjectural. See notes 34-36 supra.
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permissible use 56 to the expected public benefit derived from the regu-
lation.57 This change in perspective is consistent with growing
recognition by courts58 and commentators5 9 of "inextricable relation-
ships among property uses"'60 and the appropriateness of land use reg-
ulation for cultural and aesthetic reasons. 61 Urban property cannot be
viewed in isolation. As the New York Court of Appeals noted in Penn
Central, it is the "interaction of economic influences" which makes
the Terminal valuable.62 The surrounding city gives the Terminal
much of its value, and it is therefore appropriate to allow the city to
impose substantial restrictions on it.63
Although the Court did not reach directly the question whether
TDRs would be just compensation, 64 its analysis of the law's benefits
to and burdens on the restricted owner gave TDRs greater weight in
the taking analysis than they would have had as compensation. 65 The
56. For examples of nuisance abatement regulations upheld, see Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance forbidding excavation of gravel pit be-
low water table); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (state law requiring owner to
cut down ornamental red cedar trees to prevent disease from spreading to nearby apple
orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law prohibiting operation of
brickyard within city).
57. 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
58. E.g., Penn Central, 42 N.Y.2d at 331-32, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
918-19; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
59. Professor Sax, for example, has pointed out instances of the pervasive interrela-
tionships among property uses:
Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are tied to one another in
complex ways, and property is more accurately described as being inextricably
part of a network of relationships that is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by,
the property boundaries with which the legal system is accustomed to dealing. Fre-
quently, use of any given parcel of property is at.the same time effectively a use of,
or a demand upon, property beyond the border of the user.
Sax, supra note 14, at 152.
60. Id. at 154.
61. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (regulation of pushcart
vendors to preserve appearance and custom of French Quarter); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (prohibition on proximity of adult theaters and
bookstores to preserve character of neighborhood); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning ordinance prohibiting more than two unrelated persons from re-
siding in dwelling to protect family values); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954( (ur-
ban redevelopment condemnation for aesthetic purposes).
62. 42 N.Y.2d at 331,366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
63. The Court of Appeals required land use regulation to provide a reasonable rate
of return to land owners, but the return was to be computed only on "the privately cre-
ated ingredient of the property's value" Id. at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
921.
64. 438 U.S. at 122.
65. The dissent, having maintained that there was a taking absent consideration of
TDRs, would have remanded the case for a determination of whether the TDRs consti-
tuted just compensation. Id. at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court's approach allows TDRs of uncertain value to comprise part of
the owner's remaining use of the property. If the TDRs were not con-
sidered in the determination of the impact of the restriction, the
owner might easily be left with no reasonable beneficial use and a tak-
ing would be found.66 But even if the TDRs were very valuable, it is
questionable whether they would meet the strict requirements of just
compensation. 67 Thus, the manner in which TDRs are considered in
the taking analysis, as mitigation or compensation, may affect the re-
sult reached. The Court's approach, a consideration of the net overall
impact of the regulatory scheme, avoids the alternative of labeling
nonmonetary benefits "compensatory" and then finding them inade-
quate as just compensation.
The netting of benefits and burdens, as in Penn Central, is subject
to limitations. The Court considered the TDRs as a mitigating factor
rather than a compensatory factor, apparently in order to prevent a
taking due to the nonmonetary nature and uncertain value of the
TDRs.68 This approach undoubtedly will be limited to similar non-
monetary benefits in future cases. An award of money accompanying
a use restriction is easily given effect as compensation. More impor-
tantly, considering an award of money as mitigation of the financial
burden of regulation would vitiate the requirement of just compensa-
tion. Under such an approach, owners could demand only enough
money to increase their returns to the level of a reasonable beneficial
use.
6 9
66. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (zoning ordinance
which left plaintiff no practical use of land held unconstitutional).
67. Just compensation has been held to require a "full and perfect equivalent for the
property taken." Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326
(1893). Since the value of TDRs is determined by what they will bring on the market at a
later time, it is questionable whether they are a full equivalent at the time the restriction
is imposed. Further, TDRs are nonmonetary in nature. Although the United States Su-
preme Court has never been confronted with a case involving nonmonetary compensa-
tion, most state courts require just compensation to be monetary. See note 17 supra.
TDRs may thus be defective as just compensation both because of their nonmonetary
nature and because of their nonequivalence to the property taken. See Note, The Un-
constitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975).
68. See notes 17 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
69. Professor Costonis has proposed an "accommodation power," lying between the
police power (no compensation) and the eminent domain power (just compensation).
Compensation up to the level of a reasonable return would suffice to avoid invalidation
of land use regulation. This power would be applicable to a class of regulatory measures
and would meet the confiscation objection by "affording burdened landowners fair
compensation in the form of appropriate economic trade-offs." Costonis, supra note 14,
at 1058. Costonis points out that when many perceive themselves subject to unfair regu-
lation the result is "fierce political backlash." Id. at 1046. For a critique of the proposed
accommodation power, see Berger, supra note 24.
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The Court leaves open the degree to which TDRs will be allowed
to mitigate the financial burden of land use regulation in the future.
The Court found that Penn Central could obtain a reasonable return
on its property.70 In that return, continuing availability of the existing
use weighed most heavily and TDRs played a subsidiary role. TDRs
might be provided in other cases, for example, cases involving preser-
vation of environmentally sensitive areas, in which the impact of regu-
lation might be extreme without TDRs but moderate enough to avoid
a taking if TDRs were considered. Such cases would require a court
to rely more heavily on TDRs to sustain the measure. Allowing TDRs
to play this larger role is neither precluded nor endorsed in Penn Cen-
tral, but the Court's approach of looking to the net result of
regulatory benefits and burdens could encompass a heavier reliance
on TDRs than was necessary in Penn Central. Although a broader
role for TDRs may require more accurate determinations of their
value, 71 this difficulty can be obviated by a well-planned and carefully
implemented TDR system.72
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court in Penn Central faced both its first challenge to the due
process validity of a landmark preservation law that applied only to
select landmarks, and its first consideration of TDRs as they bear on
whether a land use regulation effects a taking. Happily for lovers of
fine, historic architecture, but unhappily for development-minded
owners of historic buildings, the Court upheld New York's Landmark
Preservation Law against a due process challenge. Happily for land
use planners, the Court upheld as constitutional the use of TDRs to
provide more flexible and fair land use regulation. The impact of the
taking clause in land use regulation will be reduced by the Court's
70. 438 U.S. at 136. See note 50 supra.
71. In an earlier case, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated as violative of
due process the rezoning of two private parks as public parks, in part because the TDRs
provided the owner were of uncertain value. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New
York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). The court found that
even when TDRs were considered, the economic value of the owner's property had been
destroyed. Id. at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12. The decision permits an
inference that the regulation would have been upheld if there had been a finding that the
TDRs were sufficiently certain in value.
72. For examples of comprehensive TDR plans, see J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT
(1974); Costonis, supra note 20; Merriam, supra note 26.
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support of TDRs as mitigation of regulatory burdens.73 The degree to
which courts allow such mitigation will determine the types of regula-
tion sustainable through TDRs. By validating the use of TDRs in a
regulatory plan, the Court has enhanced their attractiveness to land
use planners as useful tools for implementing more equitable regula-
tion.
Douglas L. Batey
73. The taking clause of the fifth amendment has been characterized as a myth. Bos-
SELMAN, supra note 14, at 318-19, 323-24. Other commentators view the taking clause
as less important today than in the past. "[T] he taking clause, having waxed in the early
decades of this century, is presently waning-contracting in the face of socially impera-
tive police power objectives." Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and
the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77,
94(1974).
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